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  <item rdf:about="http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5049">
    <title>On Intellectual Property Rights: Patents vs. Free and Open Development</title>
    <link>http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5049</link>
    <description>Title: On Intellectual Property Rights: Patents vs. Free and Open Development
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Isaac, Alan G.; Park, Walter G.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Description: 55 pages. A revision of this working paper was published in 2004 as chapter 18, pp.693--747, of The Elgar Companion to the Economics of Property Rights, edited by Enrico Colombatto. Please cite the published paper.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5048">
    <title>Varieties of Fiscal Stimulus: A Conflicting Claims Analysis</title>
    <link>http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5048</link>
    <description>Title: Varieties of Fiscal Stimulus: A Conflicting Claims Analysis
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Isaac, Alan G.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper explores the effects of fiscal policy in a conflicting claims economy where&#xD;
monetary policy follows a Taylor rule. Fiscal stimulus is decomposed into distinct vari-&#xD;
eties, depending on whether the initial effect is primarily on consumption or investment.&#xD;
Policy type proves important for the understanding of growth, unemployment, and the&#xD;
distribution of income.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Description: 15 pages. This is the working paper version of "Varieties of Fiscal Stimulus," in Per Berglund and&#xD;
Matias Vernengo (eds) The Means to Prosperity: Fiscal Policy Reconsidered (Routledge:&#xD;
November 2005) ISBN: 0415701562 Please cite the published paper.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5045">
    <title>The Moral Imperative and Social Rationality of Government-Guaranteed Employment and Reskilling</title>
    <link>http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5045</link>
    <description>Title: The Moral Imperative and Social Rationality of Government-Guaranteed Employment and Reskilling
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Wisman, Jon D.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Unemployment exacts a high cost to its victims, not only in lost income, but also in terms of quality of life (insecurity, depression, abandoned families, divorce, suicide, poorer health). It also exacts a high cost to society in terms of lost output, foregone tax revenue, depreciating human capital, and increased costs of welfare, crime, and health care. Yet modern wealthy societies have, principally for the sake of price stability and to avoid the budget costs of a full remedy, chosen to tolerate a substantial level of permanent unemployment. This article explores the moral conditions of this social choice and its rationality in terms of social welfare. It makes and develops support for two claims: society’s tolerance of involuntary unemployment is morally wrong, and it is socially and economically irrational. It concludes that government should guarantee employment by serving as employer of last resort and where appropriate provide for retraining.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Description: Working paper No. 2008-20. 47 pages.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5044">
    <title>Household Saving, Class Identity, and Conspicuous Consumption</title>
    <link>http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5044</link>
    <description>Title: Household Saving, Class Identity, and Conspicuous Consumption
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Wisman, Jon D.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The saving rate for U.S. households has long been low relative to those in other wealthy countries and in recent decades this rate has plummeted. Most studies of household saving behavior are based on the life-cycle theory of saving. However, there is doubt as to whether these studies adequately explain the low and declining rate in the U.S. This study explores two hypotheses that depart from the life-cycle explanatory framework. The first hypothesis examines the possibility that the low rate of household saving in the U.S. is related to Americans’ strong belief that vertical mobility in the U.S. is readily possible and hence their relatively weak sense of class identity. A second corollary hypothesis is that in an economy in which a high degree of vertical mobility is thought possible, a high degree of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth may reinforce the tendency to save little.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Description: working paper No. 2008-19. 38 pages.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5043">
    <title>Coral Games and the Core of Cores</title>
    <link>http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5043</link>
    <description>Title: Coral Games and the Core of Cores
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bono, James
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Many economically and politically important groups are themselves comprised of&#xD;
groups. Examples of such multi-level group structures include coalition governments,&#xD;
labor confederations and research consortia. In this paper, a model of multi-level group&#xD;
structures and an equilibrium concept are developed. The results establish that individu-&#xD;
als and groups will make tradeo®s across levels of the overall structure. Therefore, overall&#xD;
stability and overall instability can both arise from any combination of stable and unsta-&#xD;
ble levels. The framework and results have applications in many ¯elds, including political&#xD;
economy, industrial organization, and environmental economics.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Description: Working Paper No. 2008-18. 28 pages.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5042">
    <title>Adapting Strategic Risk in Corporate Tournaments</title>
    <link>http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5042</link>
    <description>Title: Adapting Strategic Risk in Corporate Tournaments
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bono, James
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The way in which agents manipulate the distribution of performance outcomes in&#xD;
strategic settings has received increasing attention in the game theory literature. This&#xD;
paper uses an evolutionary approach to examine the optimal adaptation of strategic variability&#xD;
in corporate promotion tournaments. The model describes a situation in which&#xD;
agents are promoted to a higher salary based on observable performance, which depends&#xD;
stochastically on effort. Simulation results show that the optimal adaptation of risk-taking&#xD;
is highly dependent on the population mix. However, strategies that involve adapting risk&#xD;
early in the tournament are almost never part of an evolutionarily stable state, particularly&#xD;
when using uniform initial conditions. Results also show how managers can choose&#xD;
rank-order payoff schemes and tournament lengths to optimize with respect to risk-taking&#xD;
and effort.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Description: Working Paper No. 2008-17. 19 pages.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5041">
    <title>Consumption, sentiment, and economic news</title>
    <link>http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5041</link>
    <description>Title: Consumption, sentiment, and economic news
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Starr, Martha
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper investigates the influence of economic news on consumer sentiment, and examines whether ‘news shocks’ –- changes in coverage that would not be expected from incoming data on economic fundamentals -– have aggregate effects. Using monthly U.S. data and a structural vector-autoregression, I find that (1) sentiment is affected by news shocks, (2) after filtering out effects of news shocks, shocks to sentiment still have positive effects on consumer spending, and (3) news shocks influence both spending and unemployment in significant, though transitory ways. These results are consistent with other evidence of a role of non-fundamental factors in aggregate fluctuations.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Description: Working Paper No. 2008-16. 30 pages.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5040">
    <title>Religion, Social Capital, and Business Bankruptcy in the United States, 1921-1932</title>
    <link>http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/5040</link>
    <description>Title: Religion, Social Capital, and Business Bankruptcy in the United States, 1921-1932
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Hansen, Mary Eschelbach; Hansen, Bradley A.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We consider the value of social capital that derives from membership in a church. American states with larger churchgoing populations had lower business bankruptcy rates from 1921 to 1932, and states in which the churchgoing population was concentrated in few churches had business bankruptcy rates that were lower still. Both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy were lower in states with higher church membership. The evidence suggests that church membership acted on bankruptcy through a safety net mechanism and not solely through indicating a preference for honoring commitment.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Description: Working Paper No. 2008-15. 35 pages.</description>
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